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QUO'I'ATION 
These a r e  c h a l l e n g i n g ,  e x c i t i n g ,  and d i s q u i e t i n g  t imes  f o r  t l ~ o s e  of us  
a t t empt ing  t o  ~ ~ n d e r s t a n d  t h e  making and imp lemeo~a t ion  of p u b l i c  po l i cy  and 
t h e  func t ion ing  o f  t h e  administrative s t a t e .  The c l ~ a l l e n g e  and exci tement  
stems from a  number of sou rces .  F i r s t ,  o l d  s h i b b o l e t l ~ s  nbout t h e  senescence 
of r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s ,  about  t h e  i r o n  and a n t i - p u b l i c  t r l a n g l c  o f  i ndus t ry  - 
congres s iona l  committee - agency a r e  be ing  a t t a c k e d .  On t h e  one hand, s c h o l a r s  
such a s  Richard Posner ,  James Q. Wilson, and Roger No11 have been showing t h e  
shor tcomings  o f  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  models.  We begin  t o  have a  more d i f f e r e n t i a t e d .  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d ,  and powerful unde r s t and ing  of tile r e g u l a t o r y  p rocess ,  t he  Incen- 
t i v e s  governing congres s iona l  and agency b t a f f ,  and t l ~ e  r o l e  of s o c i a l  movements 
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  r e g u l a t i o n  ( c f .  S a b a t i e r ) .  On  he o t h e r  hond, a s  Lhe agenc ie s  
i n t roduce  reform aimed a t  s t i ~ n u l a t i n g  compe t i t i on  o r  pub l i c  s c r v l c e .  t h e  pro- 
t e c t i o n i s t  image of t h e  agenc ie s  has  t o  g i v e  way. 
The c h a l l e n g e  and exci tement  a l s o  stem from Ll~c developaent  of new modes 
of a n a l y s i s .  Not on ly  do we have a  v a r i e t y  of new models,  but  we have t h e  
growth of new s u b - f i e l d s  of s tudy  sucll a s  i n ~ p l e ~ ~ ~ e n t a t l o n  : ~ n a l y s i s  ( s ee  Ilaryrove. 
1975; Williams and Elmore, Pressman and WLldnvsky, Rcln and Rab inov i t z ,  e t c . )  
t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  i l l u m l n a t e  a  massive  and important blnck box o f  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t a t e  - t h e  gap betweell pol icy  making and out con~cs ,  t l ~ c  p rocesses  
by which laws and c o u r t  d e c i s i o n s  and norms and unders t i indings  itre Lrnnsforlned 
i n t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r o u t i n e s  and procedures  t h a t  more o r  l e s s  
f a i t h f u l l y  execu te  t h e  ambiguous and n o n - a s ~ b i g ~ ~ o u s  m:~ndaLes of pol i c y .  t h a t  
t ransform t h e  schemata of p o l i c y  g o a l s  and n ~ . ~ n i f e s t  c r i t e r i a  and s t a n d c ~ r d s  i n t o  
more o r  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  p r o c e d ~ ~ r e s  and o r g a n l ~ d t i u n a l  f o r ~ u s  and bc l~ :~v io r .  
At t h e  same time t h a t  t h e r e  is a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  exci tement .  t l ~ e r e  i s  
a l s o  an  under tone of d i s q u i e t .  One sou rce  of d i s q u i e t  sLems from t h e  pessimism 
of t h e  post-60s e r a  - a  fas l l ionable  d i s p a i r  about  ou r  a b i l i t y  t o  govern,  t o  
c h a ~ ~ g e  and implen~ent  reform. A second sou rce  of d i s q u i e t  stcms Erom t h e  fcrmcnt 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l  d i scove ry  - we seem t o  be  developing new models and frameworks 
a t  an exponen t i a l  r a t e ,  bu t  w i th  l i t t l e  coherence o r  s y n t h e s i s .  Moreover, we 
d i s c a r d  o l d  approaches  wi thou t  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  o r  b u i l d i n g  upon t h e i r  s t r e n g t h s .  
For i n s t a n c e ,  Lowi's powerful and e x c i t i n g  typology o f  p o l i c y  a r e n a s  ( r egu la to ry .  
d i s t r l b u t i v e ,  and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e )  r e t a i n s  i t s  f a s c i n a t i o n  f o r  many, y e t  i ts  
vagueness and d i f f i c u l t y  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  have l e d  i t  t o  be abandoned, 
wi thout  an adequa te  replacement .  
I t  is imposs ib l e  f o r  u s  t o  d i s p e l  t h e  d i s p a i r  of t h e  moment (anyhow i t  
w i l l  change a s  t h e  s o c i e t a l  mood and problcms change)? But we can do something 
about  t h e  second sou rce  o f  d i s q u i e t .  Th i s  paper r e p r e s e n t s  a  modest a t t e s p t  
t o  p rov ide  a  s y n t h e t i c  framework u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  i n t e r p l a y  of 
po l i cy  making, r e g u l a t i o n  and implementation. Bu i ld ing  upon e a r l i e r  work on 
t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  of i n d u s t r i e s  (Wiley and Zald ,  1968; Zald and Ha i r ,  1972; 
Zald ,  1978) and implementation p rocesses  (Ilargrove, 1975) .  we a t t empt  t o  show 
how a  r e l a t i v e l y  g e n e r a l ,  connnonsensical, b u t  complex framework can be  11sefu1 
i n  ana lyz ing  p o l i c y  implementat ion and r e g u l a t i o n .  
' ~ o t e  t h a t  t h e  p e s s i m i s t i c  d e s p a i r  i s  based upon a  narrow and c lh l s to r i ca l  
view of t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of government: E i t h e r  we r e a c t  t o  momentary pro- 
blems i n  t h e  management of a  program a s  an i n d i c a t i o n  of t o t a l  f a i l u r e ,  o r  we 
ignore  t h e  wide range of w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  programs t h a t  func t ion  wi th  f a i r l y  
high e f f i c i e n c y  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
The plan of t h e  paper i s  a s  fo l lows .  F i r s t ,  we p re sen t  a  b r i e f  encnpsula- 
t i o n  of t h e  Zald framework (1978). Then we c o n s t r u c t  a  typology of po l i cy  
e a s e s  which b u i l d s  upon t h e  work o f  Lowi and Hayes (1978) and develop propo- 
s i t i o n s  about  p roces ses  i n  t h e  implementation of programs which J o i n  t h e  model 
and t h e  typology. F i n a l l y  we use  t h e  Zald framework t o  d e s c r i b e  lmplementotion 
and outcomes i n  s p e c i f i c  ca ses .  
On t h e  S o c i a l  Con t ro l  of I n d u s t r i e s  
One a s p e c t  o f  modern s o c i e t y  r e l a t i v e l y  ignored by s o c i o l o g i s e s  has  been i ts 
a t t empt  t o  cope, through a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and o r g a ~ ~ i z a t i o n o l  mechanisms, w i th  t h e  
nega t ive  e f f e c t s  o f  t echno log ica l  change and t h e  s o c i a l  problems o f  i ndus t ry  
and o rgan iza t ion .  S o c i o l o g i s t s  have documented tlie r a t e  of change and t h e  f a l l -  
o u t  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  and communities, bu t  we have l e f t  t o  p o l i t i c a l  s c l e n t i s t s  
and economists t h e  s tudy o f  t h e  pub l i c  and p r l v a t e  governance of i ndus t ry .  Thus, 
we have l a r g e l y  ignored t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  implementation of what Marx c a l l e d  "A 
Modest Magna Car t a , "  t h e  whole achievement of t h e  r i g h t s  of workcrs a t  t h e  work 
p l ace  (but  s e e  Friedmnn and Ladinsky. 1967; and more r e c e n t l y  Rntner,  1977). 
We have ignored t h e  smooth o p e r a t i o n  o f  our  r egu la to ry  mechanisms wl~ ich ,  for  
example, have l ed  t o  a  v i r t u a l  absence of explosions of p r e s s u r e  b o i l e r s  i n  com- 
merc i a l  and group e s t ab l i shmen t s ,  o r ,  mi rac l e  of mi rac l e s ,  t h e  r egu la to ry  process  
by which r a d i o  s t a t i o n s  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  channels  i n  a  way t o  s e r v e  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  
i n t e r e s t  i n  having c l e a r  r ecep t ion .  I n  r ecen t  yea r s  Zald and h i s  c o l l a b o r a t o r s  
have conducted a  number of s t u d i e s  designed t o  exp lo re  t h i s  process .  The frame- 
work has  been s p e l l e d  o u t  i n  some d e t a i l  i n  an a r t i c l e  appear ing l a t e r  t h i s  yea r .  
Here only  a  paragraph on each of t h e  major e lements  can be given.  
The components of a n a l y s i s  fo l low d i r e c t l y  from o  concept ion of s o c i a l  
c o n t r o l  and o f  i ndus t ry  and Erom a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  pe r spec t ive  on t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  
of u n i t s  i n  a  s o c i a l  system. By d e f i n i t i o n ,  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  i nvo lves  ex- 
p e c t a t i o n s  of behav io r  o r  performance ( i . e . ,  s t a n d a r d s  o f  behav io r ,  r u l e s  
of conduct ,  e x p e c t a t i o n s  of ou tpu t )  and t h e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  ( e v a l u a t i o n )  and 
sanc t ion  of d e v i a t i o n .  S ince ,  i n  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  we a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  o f  i n d u s t r i e s ,  n o t  i n d i v i d u a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  we need a  
concept t h a t  d e s c r i b e s  i ndus t ry  performance; t h i s  is provided by t h e  i d e a  of 
a  performance cu rve .  S u r v e i l l a n c e  and s a n c t i o n  a r e  conducted and imposed by 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  u n i t s  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y ,  c o n t r o l  a g e n t s .  How c o n t r o l  a g e n t s  a r e  
mandated and o p e r a t e  and how they a r e  c o n t r o l l e d  by o t h e r  e l e m e ~ l t s  of t h e  s o c i a l  
system is t r e a t e d  i n ' t h e  sociology o f  c o n t r o l  agen t s .  I f  t h e r e  were on ly  one 
c o n t r o l  agent  f o r  an i n d u s t r y  f o r  a l l  s t a n d a r d s  o f  behav io r ,  we could  e l i m i n a t e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  con tex t  o f  c o n t r o l  ( t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  
environment),  b u t  s i n c e  t h e r e  may be s e v e r a l  c o n t r o l  a g e n t s  w i th  ove r l app ing  
j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of t h e  c o n t r o l  environment must be  cons ide red .  
F i n a l l y ,  s i n c e  a  s o c i a l  system view i m p l i e s  i n t e r a c t i o n  and feedback 
loops ,  we in t roduce  t h e  concept  of compliance r e a d i n e s s  and c a p a c i t y .  The 
t a r g e t  e lements  o f  t h e  indus t ry  may have va ry ing  deg rees  of r e a d i n e s s  t o  comply 
o r  not  comply w i t h  t h e  normative s t a n d a r d s  and va ry ing  c a p a b i l i t i e s  t o  comply o r  
r e s i s t  t h e  impos i t i on  of s t anda rds .  They a r e  no t  i n e r t  r e c i p i e n t s  of c o n t r o l  
a t t empt s .  
The c o r e  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  c o n s i s t s  of an  e x p l i c a t i o n  of f i v e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  
conceptual  c l ~ ~ s t e r s :  
S t r u c t u r a l  c o n t e x t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of t h e  c o n t r o l  agen t s .  
Some i n s t i t u t i o n s  e x i s t  i n  h i e r a r c h i c a l  c o n t e x t s ,  o t h e r s  i n  po lya rch ic  ones ,  
and s t i l l  o t h e r s  i n  market c o n t e x t s ,  w i th  c o e r c i v e  law a t  t h e  boundary. The 
s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t e x t  shapes  and l i m i t s  t h e  r a n g e - o f  performance. Contexts  
can be  desc r ibed  i n  terms of t h e  number o f  c o n t r o l  a g e n t s ,  t h e  deg ree  o f  t h e i r  
Norms and performance c u r v e s .  The o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  c o ~ n p r i s e  an  -- 
i n s l i t u t i o n ,  an i n d u s t r y ,  va ry  i n  t h e i r  performance on e v a l u a ~ t v e  d l~nens ions .  
The unde r ly ing  norms vary i n  t h e i r  c l a r i t y ,  t h e i r  t e c h n i c a l  v i s i b i l i t y ,  
and   he consensus  about  t h e i r  importance among aud iences  and c o n t r o l  agen t s .  
The shape  o f  t h e  performance cu rve  is dependent upon both  t h e  c l a r i t y  and 
p r e c i s i o n  of norms, and   he s t r e n g t h  o f  demand and s a n c t l o n s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e l s  o f  performance. D i f f e r e n t  c o n t r o l  p roces ses  t ake  p l a c e  a t  upper and 
lower segments of t h e  performance curve.  
Con t ro l  a g e n t s  must i n t e r p r e t  mandates from c o n t r o l l e r  and s e t  
o p e r a t i o n a l  norms, survey i n s t i t G t i o n s  f o r  malperformnnce, and app ly  s a n c t i o n s  
( i n c e n t i v e s )  t o  g a i n  compliance. The m u l t i p l e  f u n c t i o n s  of c o n t r o l  agen t s  
and t h e i r  l i m i t e d  r e sources  means t h a t  c o n t r o l  a g e n t s  may I ~ a v e  t o  come t o  terms 
wi th  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  l i m i t s .  Moreover, t h e s e  may be compe t i t i ve  and indeed 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  norms enforced by d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r o l  a g e n t s .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  
of l a b o r  amongst c o n t r o l  a g e n t s  may make one agen t  dependent upon ano the r  whose 
g o a l s  and impera t ives  a r e  not  s u p p o r t i v e .  
The s u r v e i l l a n c e  c a p a c i t y  o f  c o n t r o l  a g e n t s  is p a r t l y  based upon t h e  e x t e n t  
t o  which performance can be  measured and i s  permanent i n  i t s  e f f e c t .  Sanc t ions  
and i n c e n t i v e s  depend upon t h e  i n t e n s i t y  of t h e  norms and t h e  l eg l t lmacy  and 
channe l s  f o r  ga in ing  an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  p roces s .  
Con~pl iance r ead ines s  (o r  c a p a b i l i t y )  is on inlporLant dimension i n  s o c i a l  
c o n t r o l  s t u d i e s  because  compliance i s  e a s i l y  gained wl~e re  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
t h e  c o n t r o l  agen t  and t h e  t a r g e t  o b j e c t  i s  sma l l .  Compliance r e a d i n e s s ,  a  
term adapa ted  from s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  impact of j u d l c i a l  d e c i s i o n s ,  v a r i e s  a long  
two dimensions  - i d e o l o g i c a l  r e a d i n e s s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  o r  econo~nic  c a p a b i l i t y .  
coo rd ina t lon  and consensus ,  and t h e  s a n c t i o n .  
.. . . 
I 
Compliance readiness deals with the organizational resistance and cap- 
abilities for implementing policies and progmms. The basic elen~cnts of the 
framework are diagrammed in Figure 1. 
Before we proceed, several prefatory comments are in order. First, in 
this social system framework, a sharp distinction is not made between policy 
making and policy implementation. New policies problen~s emerge from old 
policy implementation. Many of the same actors are involved, though to different 
degrees. Implementors have to interpret mandates and the industries being con- 
trolled attempt to shape the policies which the lmplementors interpret. Second, 
the emphasis on social control and on norms does not assume a societal consensus 
about norms and the legitimacy of power holders. We would argue that norms are 
cmergent and that total consensus betwetn controllers and controlled over what 
the standards are or should be is rarely achieved. We would also argue that 
some of the major problematics in the relation between control agents and 
target elements are found in conflicts over what should be the norms, the 
standards of behavior, and over the legitimacy of control agcnts ottcmpting 
' to enforce norms. Third, the idea of a performance curve can be used to cover 
compliance with a policy by bureaucratic agents or the actual impact of a 
policy upon social reality. It is important to be speciEic in discussions of 
performance about what is being assessed. Fourth, we use the term implementa- 
tion to menn efforts by government to achieve devised policy outcomes. 111 this 
sense, we do not draw a distinction between conventionally perceived "regulatory" 
policy like envlronmcntal programs and conventionallyperceived "service delivery" 
programs in health or education. There is often a regulatory component in both 
cases. The interesting rluestions concern processes of implementation. 
T y p o l o ~ y  of Po l i cy  I s s u e s  and Impl i ca t ions  f o r  Implementation 
One could employ an a n a l y t i c  model t o  end le s s ly  exp lo re  and exp la in  s i n g l e  
ca ses .  But i l l  o r d e r  t o  dev i se  theory from a  model which w i l l  e x p l a i n  a  un ive r se  
of c a s e s ,  i t  is u s e f u l  t o  develop middle-range typo log ie s  which group s i g n i f i -  
c a n t l y  s l m i l a r  implementation cases .  The a t t empt  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  t o  j o i n  
t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  model t o  a  typology of po l i cy  a renas  s o  t h a t  one can develop 
unders tanding of t h e  dynamics of g iven types  o f  c a s e s  and o f  t h e  cond i t i ons  which 
a f f e c t  varying l e v e l s  of performance. An a d d i t i o n a l  reason t o  j o i n  t h e  model 
wi th  a  typology i s  t o  t e s t  t h e  capac i ty  of t h e  model t o  capture r e a l i t y  and thus  
permit  i t s  p o s s i b l e  r e v i s i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  our  purpose t o  begin  t h e  process  o f  
bu i ld ing  a  r e sea rch  base  f o r  p o l i c y  a n n l y s t s  who would make "implementation e s t i -  
mates" of how programs o r e  l i k e l y  t o  work (Bargrove, 1975) .  Such e s t i m a t e s  can 
on ly  be based upon pe r sona l ,  p r u d e n t i a l  knowledge a t  p r e s e n t .  We need t o  be a b l e  
t o  g e n e r s l i z e  about  t ypes  of programs s o  t h a t  a n a l y s t s  might s e e  whether and 
how a  given c a s e  f i t s  i n t o  a  l a r g e r  framework. 
The c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a  typology is a  ve ry  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k :  
1. It is d i f f i c u l t  t o  g e t  a l l  d imensions  of p o l i c y  and programs w i t h i n  
any one schema a t  t h e  same time. For example, a  c a s e  might be placed d i f -  
f e r e n t l y  on a  performance curve depending upon w l ~ e t h e r  implementat ion o r  impact 
is t h e  c r i t e r i o n o f p e r f o r m a n c e .  Programs u s u a l l y  have more than one o b j e c t i v e  
and l o c a t i o n  of a  c a s e  i n  a  s e t  of c a t e g o r i e s  might depend upon whether t h e  
mnn i fe s t  o r  La ten t  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  jndgement. Thus. The Elementary 
and Secondary Educat ion Act of 1965 may be q u i t e  s u c c e s s f u l  a s  a  " d i s t r i b u t i v e "  
program t o  convey f e d e r a l  money t o  school-  d i s t r i c t s .  But. i t  could  be  judged 
a  f a i l u r e  i n  Lerms of t h e  " r e d i s t r i b u t i v e "  goa l  of t a r g e t i n g  funds  and s e r v i c e s  
on disadvantaged c h i l d r e n .  In  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  l a t e n t  p o l i t i c a l  goa l  
of many Congressmen and schoo l  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  is se rved  bu t  a t  t h e  expense of 
t h e  manifes t  language of t h e  law and t h e  groups  who suppor t  t hose  g o a l s .  
2.  Objec t ive  i n d i c e s  f o r  i s s u e  c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  d i f f l c ~ ~ l t  t o develop.  
It is no t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r e l y  on t h e  inhe ren t  p r o p e r t i e s  of a  p o l i c y .  For 
example, from one vantage p o i n t ,  wa te r  r c sou rce  "pork b a r r e l "  p r o j e c t s  appeor 
t o  be  " d i s t r i b u t i v e "  i n  t h a t  a l l  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  g e t  something and none appea r  
t o  l o s e  anything.  But,  viewed from anoL11er p e r s p e c r i v e ,  such programs "re- 
d i s t r i b u t e "  money i n  one d i r e c t i o n  which might w e l l  suppor t  o t h e r  purposes .  A 
r e l i a n c e  on t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  p e r c e p t i o n s  of t h e  "purpose" of a  program can a l s o  
dece ive .  Such a  pe rcep t ion ,  which w i l l  c o n t a i n  a  va lue  jtrdgcment, may have no 
r e l a t i o n  t o  what a c t u a l l y  happens i n  t h e  program. 
3.  There  a r e  o v e r l a p s  a c r o s s  t ypes  of i s s u e s  and programs i n  ways t h a t  
make i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n v e n t  c l e a r ,  mur~ la l ly  e x l ~ a u s t i v e  c a t e g o r i e s .  Thus, a  
" r egu la to ry"  program which is in t ended  t o  promote new condnct acco rd ing  t o  
r u l e s  may a l s o  c o n t a i n  " r e d i s t r i b u t i v e "  e lements .  The Occ i~pa t ions l  S a f e t y  
and Heal th  Act both  r e g u l a t e s  and r e q u i r e s  t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of c a p i t a l . r e -  
sou rces  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of l a b o r .  The Medicaid program l a  o s t e n s i b l y  "re- 
d i s t r i b u t i v e "  bu t  i t  c o n t a i n s  heavy r egu la to ry  components i n  r ega rd  t o  p s r t i c i p a -  
t i o n  and c o s t s .  One could  perhaps  f i n d  " r egu la to ry"  components i n  most f e d e r a l  
programs which would be  conven t iona l ly  desc r ibed  a s  concerned wi th  s e r v l c e  
d e l i v e r y  r a t h e r  t han  r e g u l a t i o n .  Th i s  r a i s e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  whetlter t l lere  
should be  a  r e g u l a t o r y  ca t egory  a t  a l l .  I f  a  phenumenon i s  uh lqu i tous ,  i t  
cannot  b e  a  p r i n c i p l e  of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  But i f  one d e f i n e s  " r egu la t ion"  and 
" s e r v i c e  d e l i v e r y "  i n  conven t iona l ,  d e s c r i p t i v e  ways, t h e  c n t e g o r l c s  nloy c e a s e  
t o  be  a n a l y t i c  and become s o l e l y  d e s c r i p t i v e .  Another complication a r i s e s  i n  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  whether one i s  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
power o r  wea l th .  The p rocesses  and consequences a r e  d i f f e r e n t  i n  e i t h e r  c a s e  
and c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  which embraces bo th  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  is d i f f i c u l t .  
These three problems are present in the best attempts at issue typologies 
(Lowi, 1964; ~alisb"r~. 1968; Ilayes, 1978). Salisbury and Hayes have developed 
adaptations of Lowi's three categories: distributive, regulatory, and redistrib- 
utive, but the difficulties have not been fully overcome. Lowi supplies no ob- 
jective indices for placing an issue in one category rather than another. Salis- 
bury and Hayes turn to objectively determinable political patterns as the basis 
for categorization. We are arguing that these patterns of support and conflict 
over policy have strong implications for the effectiveness of implementation. 
Salisbury develops objective indices for the categories according to the 
pattern of political support and opposition. "Distributive" policies are per- 
ceived to confer direct benefits upon one or more groups. But there is little 
or no political conflict over the passage of the legislation. Rather, there 
is bargaining about the distributive pattern. "Redistributive" policies confer 
benefits but are perceived to take benefits away from other groups and, there- 
fore, generate strong political conflict. Salisbury does not require that 
redistribution win out. But there must be a perception of what is at stake. 
"Regulatory" policies constrain the behavior of groups in specific ways that 
will affect their future choices. The actual future outcome is not known and, 
therefore, focus is upon the rules which are written to regulate future be- 
havior. (Salisbury, 1968, p. 158). 
The strength of Salisbury's use of the term regulation is in Its descrip- 
tive conventio~iallty. We clearly understand that a regulatory policy is different 
frgm a policy that distributes goods or services. However, there is a problem. 
Regulation in this conventional sense also occurs in distributive and redistri- 
butive policy areas. In many social programs, there is an attempt to affect 
the distribution of power as well as benefits and services. Yet, Salisbury 
uses the terms distributive and redistributive to refer to "benefits" rather 
than "power." If one broadens the term benefits to include power; it is not 
clear why a regulatory category is required at all. 




group "regulatory" policies in the conventional sense, as deflned by Salisbury, 
i 
and "service delivery" policies to be grouped together on each dimension. 
Hayes defines "regulatory" in an unconventional way as a policy area in 
which the balance of opposing political forces is neither non-zero sum nor 
zero sum. Rather, a balanced conflict leads to a balanced outcome in which 
there are no clear winners or losers. The question of the final distribution 
of either power or benefits is thus not fully resolved by the legislature but 
is passed on to the bureaucracy and the costs for a continuing politics of 
implementation. Regulatory policies, by this definition, are sytnbolic and 
discretionary. Unlike distributive and redistributive policies, they give 
us mixed results. (Hayes. 1978, p. 149). Hayes builds on the Salisbury de- 
finition by keeping the idea of uncertainty as a key to regulatory policies. 
New rules are written, but the benefits are not altogether clear. Yet, he 
broadens the definition to include both power and benefits. 
One value of Hayes' defintion of regulation is that we are given a term 
which captures a common reality in which outcomes are neitl~er distributive nor 
redistributive. This use of the term also permits the dimensions of power and 
Thus, many of the "regulatory" policies described by llayes are service delivery 
programs such as the poverty program wliicl~ failed to carry out redistributive 
purposes. By the same token, a service delivery program wlth a high regulatory 
component, such as The Education of A11 Handicapped Children Act of 1976, could 
- be placed on the redistributive scale if the outcomes are in fnct redistributive. 
I 
! Lowi categorizes solely by perceptions of purpose. Salisbury adds patterns 
i 
of politics about purpose. Hayes incorporates these ideas and adds a concern 
i 
I 
with actual outcomes. Ile refers to outcomes as the supply of types of legislation 
in relation to the pattern of political demands. Tlrere are matches between 






Hayes argues that if the political process is consensual thnt Congress 
will develop either a self-regulatory or a distribu~ive policy in response 
depending upon the issue. The delegation of decisionsabout price support 
levels to a given group of farm producers would be delegative and self- 
regulatory. The allocation of money in a classic "pork barrel" olilnner would be 
distributive. 
Hayes postulates that interest groups will seek to win benefits through 
government action by avoiding open conflict with other groups if nt all possible. 
They will try to disguise the special benefits by presenting the issue as a 
consensual, distributive one. 
He also postulates that members of Congress will seek to convect an 
open conflict between groups into a consensual form by taking symbolic and 
ambiguous action which seemingly satisfies all parties but which actually 
transfers the conflict to bureaucracy or the courts. It follows from ~l~is. 
according to Hayes, that there will be very few genulnely redis~ributive cases. 
The intervention of additional actors and events, such as an overwhelming 
victory in a presidential election may create a brief period of redistrtbuLive 
politics and policy, but this is not the norm in American politics. In fact. 
when considered from the implementation perspective, redistributive programs 
which have become politically acceptable no longer appear to be redistributtve 
because the conflict which took place at ~helr creation has subsided, and they 
are often justified publicly in distributlve language. 
We favor llayes' definitions because they hove clear implicnttons for the 
implementation process. Lowi and Salisbury focus upon the ini~lal decision 
process of the legislature. They are concerned with the perceptions of pro- 
tagonists about the benefits which are likely to occur from given legialative 




witl~in his scheme of categorization. Thus. his model is most compatible with 
our interest in assessing the positions of programs on performance curves. 
Outcomes can be assessed according to the distrib~rtion of both power and bene- 
fits. Salisbury and Hayes both invent new categories of issue typcs to supple- 
ment the origins1 three. We do not reject these but have stayed with three 
issue types in order to simplify what is already a complex discussion. 
This scheme would seem to resolve the three problems of typology con- 
struction raised earlier: 
1. The problem of plurality of policy goals on a one dimensional 
schema can be handled by making clear whether the performance curve is to be 
used to assess the implementation or the impact of policy. One schema cannot 
do both simultaneously. 
2 .  The problems of absence of objective indices for the location of an 
issue is resolved by an assessment of actual dcmand and supply patterns. 
For exnmple, one could contend that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is 
s success as a distributive program but a redistributive failure. Latent, 
political goals, have won out over the manifest, rhetorical goals. But should 
the case be placed in our schema as a distributive case with a high performance 
curve or as a redistributive case with a low performance curve? Either location 
would fail to capture the actual dcmand and supply patterns. The case belongs 
on the regulatory dimension st the low end of the performance curve. The 
policy was a mix of symbol and substance and each contained both distributive 
and redistributive elements. The political struggle for control of the program 
has continued throughout its implcmcntation. 
3 .  The confusing overlap in issue chnracteristics among types is manageable 
if the categories are sufficiently abstract and analytically distinct. This 
has required a definition of regulatory which departs from common usage. 
Finally the intended focus of the developers of this typology was on the 
policy formation stage and we have adapted it for the s~udy of the implementation 
of policies. This enables one to see implementation successes and failures as 
in part the consequences of the politics of policy formation. This permits 
the development of prescriptions for improvement in implementation to toke 
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The v i r t u e  of combining t h e  model of implementat ion v a r i a b l e s  and t h e  
typology of i s s u e s  is t h a t  one i s  a b l e  t o  compare c a s e s  on a  performance curve of 
implementation according t o  type  o f  i s s u e .  The typology i s s u e  is no t  j u s t  a  
s t a t l c  s k e l e t o n  on which t o  hang cases .  Ra the r ,  one wishes  t o  a s k  i f  t h e r e  
a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  implementation p rocesses  and problems acco rd ing  t o  t h e  type 
of i s s u e .  
Two s e t s  o f  measures a r e  r equ l r ed  f o r  such a  combination. Programs a r e  
placed on i s s u e  dimensions acco rd ing  t o  demand and supp ly  p a t t e r n s .  Thus, 
a  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  a l l o c a t i o n  of r e sou rces  w i l l  fo l low from a  c o n f l i c t u a l  demand 
p a t t e r n  wl~ ich  l e a d s  t o  c l e a r  winners  and l o s e r s .  The. second kind of measure 
r equ i r ed  is t h e  a s scs sn~en t  of t h e  degree  o f  e a s e  o r  d i f f i c u l t y  of imp le~nen ta t lon  
on a  performance curve w i t h i n  each i s s u e  a r e a .  
One must i d e n t i f y  s p e c i f i c  programs f o r  each o f  t h e s e  g e n e r a l  i s s u e  
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s .  For example, f e d e r a l  a i d  t o  s c h o o l s  f o r  d isadvantaged 
c h i l d r e n  r e f e r s  h e r e  t o  The Elementary and Secondary Educat ion Act of 1969, 
manpower t r a i n i n g  r e f e r s  t o  The Co~nprehensive 'Employment Act of 1973 and s o  
f o r t h .  Ca tegor i za t ion  of t h i s  k ind must be  s p e c i f i c  a s  t o  program because  pro- 
grams w i t h i n  t h e  same i s s u e  a r e a  might belong i n  d i f f e r e n t  p l a c e s  i n  t h e  schema. 
For example, Head S t a r t ,  which a l s o  a i d s  d i sadvan taged  c h i l d r e n ,  is c l e a r l y  a  
r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  program. 
Ambiguity 1s not  e l imina ted  by t h e  typology.  The ESEA, f o r  exnn~ple ,  
cou ld -be  placed on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  l i n e  i f  i t  is  seen  a s  a  program which 
p r imar i ly  d i s t r i b u t e s  f e d e r a l  funds ,  a s  g e n e r a l  a i d ,  t o  school  sys tems.  However, 
some o f  t hose  funds  a r e  t a r g e t e d  on disadvantaged c h i l d r e n .  T l ~ e r e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
p o l i t i c a l  d isagreement  about  t h e  purpose of t h e  program t h a t  i t  i s  b e t t e r  p laced 
i n  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  l i n e .  I t  f a l l s  s h o r t  of be ing  a  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  i s s u e  because  
those  groups who demand a  thoroughly r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  program have not won. This  
accounts  f o r  t he  mlx i n  ESEA programs between d i s t r i b u t i v e  and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  
outcomes. Hayes' c a t e g o r i e s  of demand p a t t e r n s  and supply provide t h e  i n d i c e s  
f o r  l o c a t i o n  of c a s e s  on i s s u e  l i n e s .  In  t h i s  s ense  t h e  "supply" provided by 
t h e  program 1s a func t ion  o f  t h e  "demand" p a t t e r n .  
However, t h e s e  a n a l y t i c  c a t e g o r i e s  do not  provide i n d i c e s  f o r  t h e  loca-  
t i o n  o f  c a s e s  on t h e  performnnce curve.  The c l ~ i e f  c r i t e r i o n  of a  h igh,  medium, 
o r  low p o s i t i o n  on t h e  curve i s  t h e  degree  t o  whicl~ t h e  program has  a c t u a l l y  
been implemented i n  accordance wi th  i ts manifes t  i n t e n t :  At t h e  p re sen t  t ime. 
we have no i n d i c e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  degrees  of implementation beyond gene ra l  ob- 
s e r v a t i o n  and f a m i l i a r i t y  w i th  t h e  program. Exper ts  w i l l  s ~ r r e l y  d i s a g r e e  h e r e  
( indeed,  t h e  a u t h o r s  d i s a g r e e  amongst themselves) .  But t h e  d i scuss ion  s e r v e s  
t h e  purpose o f  t h e  schema, which i s  t o  promote r e sea rch  upon t h e  implementation 
o f  programs. It could  be premature t o  formulate  d e t a i l e d ,  o b j e c t i v e  i n d i c e s  f o r  
t he  placement of c a s e s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s  on t h e  performance curve.  T l ~ e r e  has  
not  been s u f f i c i e n t  comparative r e sea rch  on such c a s e s .  But t h e  development of 
i n d i c e s  should be one o b j e c t i v e  of t h a t  r e sea rch .  
The positioning of programs a t  t h e  t h r e e  p o i n t s  of t h e  performance curve 
i n  Table  2 fo l lows from our  judgment based on gene ra l  f a m i l i a r i t y  w i th  t h e s e  
cases .  
The Zald concepts  and v a r i a b l e s  do not  supply  i n d i c e s  of performance. They 
a r e  used t o  develop p ropos i t i ons  t o  exp la in  the  l o c a ~ l o n  of c a s e s  on t l ~ e  per- 
formance curve.  
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of c a s e s  placed a t  t he  l ~ l g h  end o f  t h e  pcrfornwnce curve 
appear  t o  be the  fol lowing:  high agreemenL upon s p e c i f i c  objectives among t h e  
proximal dominating p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s ;  specificity of obJecLives;  a d n ~ i n i s t r a t i v e  
s i m p l i c i t y  of t h e  implementation t a s k ;  high compliance c a p a b l l i t y  on t h e  p a r t  of 
t h e  t a r g e t s  of t h e  po l i cy ;  a  h igh congruence of b ~ ~ r e a \ ~ c r a t i c  Incen t ives  i n  
accordance with the manifest purposes of the law at all levels of government; 
the existence of effective sanctions for higher levels of government to invoke 
against lower levels; and a tangible and highly-valued product from the 
program. 
Those cases on the low end of the curve appear to share the following 
chsracteristics: considerable disagreement on goals among the proximal dominant 
politics1 elite; ambiguous specific objectives; administrative complexity of 
implementation; low compliance readiness and capability of targets; less fnvor- 
able leverage for the application of sanctions by higher levels of government 
against lower levels; intangible, uncertain or diffuse products from the program. 
Cases at mid-point are difficult to characterize as a group but are 
better analyzed individually. They share characteristics of the high and 
low position in unique ways. For example, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has 
been easier to lmplcment than the Clean Air Act amendn~ents of 19-. The former 
was targeted on a few southern states, was easily administered and gathered 
great political support behind it. The latter encompassed the entire nation. 
is difficult to administer and is the subject of continuous politlcal and leg- 
islative challenge. Yet, it has been carried out to a considerable degree. 
It has not been subverted or watered down like many cases on the low end of the 
regulatory line. 
There will also be varincions in implementation on each of the issue 
dimensions according to variations in patterns of political demand and policy 
supply. One Ll~en employs the variables in the Zald model to discriminate between 
degrees of effective implementation of programs according to type of issue: 
1. Implementation is easier in distributive cases than in the other two 
categories because there is less political conflict and greater congruence of 
bureaucratic incentives between levels of government. 
2 .  Implen~entation is most difficult in rrgulaLory cases because of the ' 
ambiguity of goals, the clash of bureaucratic incentives and the high levels 
of continuing political conflict about administration. 
3. Implementation is less difficult in redistributive cases thnn in the 
regulatory area but more difficult than In distributive cases. 
a. Once   he outcome attains political legitimacy, political conflict is 
reduced. Thus, a complete redistribuilve case takes on some of the 
consensual characteristics of a distributive case. 
b. The residue of the initial open politlcal conflict continues at 
administrative levels. 
The actual position of given programs as performance curves in each issue 
area are shaped by varying combinations of variables in the Zald model. The 
placing of cases becomes an empirical question. 
Explaining the Variance and Level of Policy Outcome 
Implementation arenas vary in the number of conirol agents involved, 
their sanctions and surveillance capacities, the implementation task or n~rmber 
and kinds of changes required, the channels through which implc~nentstion must 
take place, the degree of opposition to the change and the clarity of goals and 
programs that are associated with the underlying norm. Iiere we present several 
cases in which there is variance in one dimension or another relevant to our 
framework. 
Voting Rights and School Desegregation in the South. Both of thesc issues 
required massive changes in the performance of the industries which were the 
targets of change. Both cases also involve massive political-ideological reaia- 
tance. They dlffer mainly in the kind of sanction that ultimr~tely proved 
effective. though in both cases the sanction was strong indeed. 
I 
Following t h e  C i v i l  War Blacks were en f ranch i sed  throughout t h e  South. 
Yet a f t e r  t h e  r e t r e a t  o f  Recons t ruc t ion  Blacks were d i sen f ranch i sed  and ba r r ed  
from r e g i s t r a t i o n  and v o t i n g .  By 1904 Black r e g i s t r n t i o n  was minuscule  and 
s t ayed  t h a t  way u n t i l  t h e  1960s. The mechanisms through which b l acks  were 
d i sen f ranch i sed  inc luded  t h e  p o l l  t a x ,  l i t e r a c y  t e s t s ,  o u t r i g h t  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  
and economic and phys i ca l  c o e r c i o n  and i n t i m i d a t i o n .  The a t t a c k  on t h e  system 
of exc lus ion  involved p o l i t i c a l - l e g a l  a c t i o n  a t  s e v e r a l  l e v e l s ;  t h e  p o l l  t a x  
was dec l a red  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  t h e  J u s t i c e  Department sued employers who d i s -  
missed t h e i r  workers  when they  t r i e d  t o  r e g i s t e r ,  and s o  on. Moreover, w i th  
t h e  emergence of t h e  C i v i l  R i g h t s  Movement i n  t h e  e a r l y  1960s ,  a  number of 
a t t empt s  were made t o  r e g i s t e r  Blacks  and t o  b r i n g  s u i t s  a g a i n s t  recalcitrant 
l o c a l  r e g i s t r a r s  and even t o  r e p l a c e  them wi th  Fede ra l  r e g i s t r a r s .  Yet t h e  
mechanism f o r  doing s o  was cumbersome and involved a  g r e a t  d e a l  of l e g a l  re-  
sou rces  and time. I n  o r d e r  t o  appo in t  a  Fede ra l  r e f e r e e ,  t h e  government had t o  
f i l e  s u i t  i n  a  f e d e r a l  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  and o b t a i n  a  c o u r t  f i n d i n g  no t  on ly  of 
d i sc r imina to ry  d i sen f ranch i semen t ,  b u t  t h a t  such a c t i v i t y  was a  p e r s i s t e n t  
p a t t e r n  of o r  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a .  Then. f o r a t l e a s t  a  y e a r  a f t e r  
such a  f i nd ing ,  a  person d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t  could  apply  f o r  an  o r d e r  d e c l a r i n g  
him o r  he r  q u a l i f i e d  t o  vo te .  To g e t  such an o r d e r  r equ i r ed  ano the r  l ong  pro- 
ce s s .  The c o u r t  could  h e a r  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  o r  could  a t  i t s  d i s c r e t i o n  appo in t  
r e f e r e e s  from amongst q u a l i f i e d  v o t e r s  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t .  The C i v i l  R igh t s  Act 
of 1960 d i d  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  Between 1962 and 64, 
Black r e g i s t r a t i o n  inc reased  683.000 o r  46 pe rcen t  i n  t h e  1 1  sou the rn  s t a t e s  
and 43 pe rcen t  of t h e  v o t i n g  age  popu la t ion  was e n r o l l e d .  Yet i n  ~~ lnny  deep sou th  
s t a t e s .  l i t t l e  p rog res s  had been made. 
The 1965 Vot ing R igh t s  Act r equ i r ed  t h e  J u s t i c e  Department t o  send i n  a  
Federal  examiner w l~e reve r  l e s s  t han  50 pe rcen t  of t h e  v o t i n g  age  popu la t ion  
was r e g i s t e r e d .  That  i s ,  i n s t e a d  of a  case-by-case proof of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  
a  s imple  s t a t i s t i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  could  be  employed wi thou t  c o u r t  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  
I n  Alabama, r e g i s t r a t i o n  went from 19.3  pe rcen t  t o  51.6 p e r c e n t ,  i n  Ceorgia  
from 27.4 t o  52.5, i n  M i s s i s s i p p i  from 6.9 t o  59.8. While r e g i s t m t i o n  went 
up most d r a m a t i c a l l y  i n  c o u n t i e s  w i ~ h  f e d e r a l  r c g i s t r a r s .  o t l ~ e r  c o u n t i e s  a l s o  
showed g r e a t  change,  more than doubl ing t h e i r  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  However, t h e  
J u s t i c e  Department l acked  personnel  and money t o  send r e g i s t r a r s  i n t o  every 
county,  s o  they d i d  no t  send r e g i s t r a r s  i n t o  c o u n t i e s  w l th  l e s s  t han  1 ,000  
b l acks ;  t h i s  e l i m i n a t e d  185 c o u n t i e s  from t h e  program. 
The v o t i n g  r i g h t s , c a s e  can be used t o  i l l u s t r a t e  s e v e r a l  a s p e c t s  of ou r  
framework. F i r s t ,  t h e r e  was a  massive  non-compliance wi th  t h e  normat ive  g o a l s  
based upon p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l  d isagreement  o f  t h e  element of Lhe i n d u s t r y .  
Second, Lhere was no economic o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  problem. The i~oplcmenLing . 
a c t i o n  was s imp le :  r e g i s t e r  o r  no t  r e g i s t e r .  T h i r d ,  on ly  when t h e  Fede ra l  
government t h rea t ened  and a c t u a l l y  d i d  remove t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of t h e  l o c a l  
r e g i s t r a r ,  i n  e f f e c t  making r e g i s t r a t i o n  p a r t  of t ho  Fede ra l  .bureaucracy (o r  
t ransforming t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  con tex t  from a  p o l y a r c h i c  one t o  a  l l i c r aech ic  one ) ,  
was compliance a c t u a l l y  achieved.  (Note t o o  t l l a t  Congress Itever au tho r i zed  
c r i m i n a l  s a n c t i o n s ;  we suspec t  t h a t  any a t t empt  t o  have l o c a l  r e g i s L r a r s  i m -  
pr isoned would have been coun te r -p roduc t ive ,  making marLyrs of t h e s e  middle 
c l a s s  f u n c t i o n a r i e s ) .  F i n a l l y ,   he h igh  l e v e l  of t h e  C l v i l  Rlgl~Ls Movement 
This  a n a l y s i s  draws upon Handler,  Chapter  I V  and upon Har rc l  Hodgers 
and Char l e s  Bul lock,  111, Law and S o c i a l  Change. 
a c t i v i t y ,  w i th  many vo t ing  r e g i s t r a t i o n  p r o j e c t s  i n  o p e r a t i o n ,  meant t h a t  t h e r e  
was a  high l e v e l  of s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  l o c a l  r e g i s t r a t i o n  a c t i v i t y .  Without t h a t  
l e v e l  o f  s u r v e i l l a n c e ,  many fewer r e g i s t r a n t s  would have been mob i l i zed ,  and 
token r e s i s t a n c e  would have discouraged t h e  r e g i s t r a n t s .  1 
A s i m i l a r  s t o r y  can be  t o l d  about  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  school  dewegregat lon 
i n  t h e  sou th .  The s t o r y  has  been w e l l  docu~nented i n  Gary O r f i e l d ' s  mas t e r ly  
The Reconstruct ion o f  Southern Educat ion.  Again, t h e  case-by-case approach 
f a i l e d .  1.ocal s choo l  boards  were prepared t o  c o n t e s t  s u i t s  and spend money on 
appea l s .  F i n a l l y ,  Congress enacted The Elementary and Secondary School Act of 
1965 wliich au tho r i zed  spending l a r g e  amounts of money f o r  "disadvantaged" 
c h i l d r e n .  A p r o v i s o  of t h e  C i v i l  R igh t s  Act of 1964 p r o h i b i t e d  t h e  spending of 
Fede ra l  monies on seg rega ted  f a c i l i t i e s .  Many sou the rn  schoo l  d i s t r i c t s  found 
themselves wi th  t h e  p rospec t  o f  l o s i n g  one-four th  t o  one - th i rd  of t h e i r  budget .  
The s t o r y  i s  more complicated than t h i s .  i n c l u d i n g  changes i n  tl ie O f f i c e  of 
Education l ead ing  t o  a  m o r e a g g r e s s i v e s t a n c e  vis-a-vis  t h e  s t a t e s  and a  massive 
i n c r e a s e  i n  s u r v e i l l s n c e  and p rocess ing  c a p a c i t y .  But t h e  O f f i c e  of Educat ion 
had t o  c e r t i f y  t h a t  sys tems were deseg rega ted  o r  had p l a n s  f o r  deseg rega t ion  t h a t  
were accep tab le .  There was a  g r e a t  r u s h  t o  g e t  c e r t i f i c a t i o n .  By t h e  end of t h e  
19608 sou the rn  school. d i s t r i c t s  were s u b s t a n t i a l l y  descg rega tcd ,  indeed more s o  
than  no r the rn  ones .  
%he e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h i s  concer ted t j u rve i l l ance  is one reason t l ~ e r e  ha8 
been s o  much more compliance i n  t h i s  a r e a  than  i n  t h e  a r e a  of s choo l  p raye r s .  
I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  t h e  v i r t ~ r a l  absence o f  e f f e c t i v e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  may have 
r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  Supreme Courts  e d i c t  c r e a t i n g  more non-compliance a f t e r  t h e  
As con t r a s t ed  wi th  t h e  v o t i ~ i g  r i g h t s  i s s u e .  a  t ec l ln l ca l ly  compllcnted 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  change was r equ i r ed  wi th  g r e a t e r  f i n a n c i a l  I m p l i c a t i o n s .  Yet 
t h e  u s e  of a  massive.economic sanc t ion  l ed  t o  widespread chnnge. Both t h e  
v o t i n g  r i g h t s  and schoo l  deseg rega t ion  i s s u e s  r equ i r ed  d racon ian  s a n c t i o n s  t o  
cliange t h e  pcrfqrmance l e v e l  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  be ing  r egu la t ed .  L e t  us  t u r n  
t o  a  p o l i c y  a rena  where t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  con t rove r sy  and r e s i s t a n c e  i s  much 
l e s s ,  b u t  wllere programs va ry  i n  t h e i r  c l i l r i t y  of g o a l s  a s  mandated by Congress 
and where t h e  r e l a t j o n  o f  programs t o  ends-in-vlew i s  l e s s  appa ren t .  , 
The n e c e s s i t y  f o r  s t r o n g  s a n c t i o n s a p p e a r s  t o  be more important  i n  t h e s e  
two " regu la to ry"  c a s e s  t han  i t  does  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  c a s e s  
a t  t h e  high end o f  t h e  continuum. However, s t r o n g  p o s i t i v e  s a n c t i o n s  of an 
undramatic n a t u r e  a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  i n s t a n c e s .  I n  both  types  of c a s e s ,  
p o l i t i c a l  and b u r e a u c r a t i c  i n c e n t i v e s  a r e  congruent  down t h e  v e r t i c a l  l i n e  o f  
government and t h e  g l u e  o f  u n i t y  i s  money d i s t r i b u t e d  by t h e  f e d e r a l  government. 
T& programs f o r  -- t h e  unemployed: Unemployment In su rance ,  C E ,  and 
t h e  Employment Se rv ice .  Unemployment I n s ~ ~ r a n c e  and t h e  United S t a t e s  Employ- -
ment S e r v i c e  a r e  t h e  o l d e r  o f  t h e s e  programs. A l l  t h r e e  a r e  administered through 
t h e  Department of Labor; a l l  t h r e e  a r e  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  programs i l l  which tlie s t a t e  
' and l o c a l  governments have t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  implemenrlng and c a r r y  t h e  
burden of a c t u a l  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  agenc ie s ,  though wi th  Federal  fundlng.  One 
might a rgue  t h a t  t h e  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  have a  c l e a r e r  and more a u t l i o r i t a t l v e  r o l e  
i n  UI and USES than i n  CETA, y e t  k t  does no t  appea r  t o  u s  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  
performance is a  func t ion  of d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s t a t e - f e d e r a l  r e l a t i o n s  a s  much a s  
i t  r e s i d e s  i n  t h e  c l a r i t y  of o b j e c t i v c s  and of t h e  r e l o t l o n s h i p  of t a s k s  o r  
programs t o  ends-in-view. 
Cour t ' s  enunc ia t ion  of pub l i c  p o l i c y  than  be fo re .  
Unemployment Insurance 
The norms that underlie the UI program are fairly clear if one is referring 
to policy objectives or ends. Regularly employed workers who are out of work 
are entitled to benefits for a given period of time as set in the legislation. 
There seems to be no challenge within the system of dellvery or in the larger 
society to this goal. It has become increasingly legitimate over time. There 
is some disagreement over benefits to be paid during any periods of recession 
when hard times fall on many workers. and the question of the extension of 
the time for which beneficiaries are eligible for UI checks becomes paramount. 
The other question has to do with the desire of employers to keep benefits at 
reasonable levels and with state agencies to keep autonomy over the level of 
benefits. The benefits are tangible and, therefore, administration has a cer- 
tain simplicity to it. 
The unemployment compensationprogram is administered by the states according 
to quite different schedules of benefits. The program is paid for through the 
contributions of employers to a national trust fund. The Federal Office of 
Unemployment Insurance in the Department of Labor distributes funds to states 
according to a formula based on estimates of need and evaluations of state per- 
formance. The Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies speaks for 
the states to the Department of Labor and Congress in regard to the implementa- 
tion of the program. 
Surveillance and sanctlon of performance is done under the authority of 
the federal bureau over the state agencies of employment security wl~ich administer 
the law. It is our impression tl~at historically the federal bureau bas not had 
great authority but has engaged in technical assistance to the statcson the 
development of computer systems and service delivery metl~ods and has been an 
arbiter between the contending claims of the states in regard to levels of 
benefits and an agent with the Congress in the same regard. In recent years, 
the federal bureau has begun to assess the performance of state agencles in 
terms of efficiency of operations and to allocate budgets accordingly. The UI 
Office has a cost model which it uses to assess the effectiveness of state 
agencies in distribution of benefits judged in terms of criteria of efficiency. 
Because there is a high degree of concensus in the system and the benefits are 
tangible and can be linked to varying degrees of efficiency in administration, 
there is a clear authoritative role for the federal agency, but it is con- 
strained in part by the pressures which come up through the I~~terstate Conference 
on Employment and Security. 
The states vary in compliance readiness and compliance capability as s 
function of bureaucratic and professional capacltics and the political culture 
of the states in regard to the distribution and level of benefits. Ilowever, all 
unemployed citizens who are covered by the system are eligible for the benefits 
so that there are minimal performance curves which are achieved in every state. 
The target element elites seem to agree with the norms and the costs of con!- 
pliance to a great extent. Although there is variance In actual benefit levels, 
there appears to be little variance in technical efficiency. Workers get their 
checks. funding formulas are clear, and within the mandated coverage criterin 
states exercise little discretion. 
CETA (& Comprehensive Employment and Tralnlng Act). -
CETA was passed in 1973 as the successor to the Manpower Development and 
Training Act of 1962. The Manpower Developmcn~ and Training Act wus nriginnlly 
developed ia response to the assumed problem of automation and structural unem- 
ployment due to tecl~nological 'displaccment.  In time, it was converted to ser- 
vice to the disadvantaged and the poverty program in order Lo bring those 
without  s k i l l s  i n t o  l a b o r  markets  through s k i l l  t r a i n i n g .  It was thus  t i e d  t o  
t h e  War on Pover ty .  A number of c a t e g o r i c a l  programs i n  MDTA were d i r e c t e d  
towards s p e c i f i c  groups  i n  t h e  popu la t ion ,  i . e .  youth ,  o l d e r  workers ,  a g r i c u l -  
t u r a l  workers. e t c .  MDTA was admin i s t e r ed  by f e d e r a l  r e e l o n a l  o f f i c e s  who 
l e t  c o n t r a c t s  t o  d e l i v e r e r s  of s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  s t a t e s  and c i t i e s ,  most of which 
were no t  l o c a l  governments.  It was thus  a  c e n t r a l i z e d  and categorized program. 
CETA is a  modified form o f  s p e c i a l  revenue s h a r i n g .  Over 400 Prime Sponsors 
composed of c i t y ,  s t a t e ,  and county governments have organized themselves  i n t o  
planning and r e source  a l l o c a t i o n  agenc ie s  t o  develop manpower t r a i n i n g  p l a n s  
f o r  t h e i r  a r e a s .  These p l a n s  must meet w i th  f e d e r a l  app rova l ,  and t h e  funding 
is f e d e r a l .  
The same ambigui ly  i n  'regard t o  ends i s  found i n  both  MDTA and CETA. The 
language of both  laws,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  r ega rd  t o  subsequent  amendments of 
MDTA and t h e  c r e a t i o n  of c a t e g o r i c a l  programs, and t h e  man i fe s t  language of I 
! 
t h e  CETA Act s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  popu la t ion  t a r g e t  is t o  be  t h e  d i s -  
advantaged. liowever, t l ~ e r e  i s  a l s o  l a t i t u d e  f o r  j ob  t r a i n i n g  f o r  t h e  unemployed 
' who a r e  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  disadvantaged.  There  is a l s o ,  i n  CETA, a  problem of 1 
1 
ambiguity and i n s t a b i l i t y  of norms i n  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  deg ree  of a u t h o r i t y  
between t h e  f e d e r a l  bureau and t h e  Prime Sponsors  is vagne and must be  worked 
o u t  through ba rga in ing .  (This  a n a l y s i s  exc ludes  t h e  p u b l i c  employment p a r t  of 
CETA, a l though t h a t  I s  a  very  inlportant e lement  o f  t h e  law). During r eces s ions .  
such a s  1974-75. Congress has  beefed up t h e  p u b l i c  employment t i t l e  of t h e  Act 
t o  permit l o c a l  govcrrnnents t o  h i r e  t h e  unemployed on a  s l ~ o r t - t c r m  b a s i s .  There 
has  been c o n s i d e r a b l e  con t rove r sy  about  whether t h e  disadvantaged have been 
helped i n  t h i s  r ega rd  and whether ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e r e  has  not  s imply been a  d i s -  
placement e f f e c t  i n  which f e d e r a l  funds a r e  used t o  pay f o r  people  who were 
formerly  on s t a t e  and l o c a l  p a y r o l l s .  
Su rve i l l ance  and s a n c t i o n  of perEormance o f  Prime Sponsors by t h e  f e d e r a l  
bureau has  been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  bu reau  t o  assume t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  r o l e  expected o f  i t  i n  a s s i s t i n g  l o c a l  Prime Sponsors  t o  
develop planning and e v a l u a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  Rather  t h e  f e d e r a l  agency has  
pursued a  p ro  forma compliance,  emphasizing approva l  o f  p l a n s  and f i n a n c i a l  
account ing.  Throughout t h i s  p roces s  t l ~ e r e  has  been s t e a d y  e r o s i o n  of a u t l l o r i t y  
from t h e  c e n t e r  t o  t h e  pe r iphe ry ,  and t h e  Prime Sponsors  have i n c r e a s i n g l y  
been a b l e  t o  s e t  t h e  terms o f  who is se rved  by t h e  program. Prlme Sponsors 
have n o t  developed t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  t o  acLtrally p l an  s e r v i c e s  Tor l a b o r  mi~rket  
a r e a s .  Rather ,  p o l i t i c a l  i n c e n t i v e s  of l o c a l  e l e c t e d  o C f i c l a l s  have been 
paramount, and t h e r e  has  been a n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  wide d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s e r v l c e s  
t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  n e g l e c t  of t h e  disadvantaged.  ( P o l i t i c a l  incenLives  havc been 
c r e a t e d  by t h e  ve ry  ambigui ty  o f  t h e  program, p e r m i t t i n g  o f f i c e h o l d e r s ,  
e l e c t e d  and appointed,  t o  u s e  CETA monies f o r  favored p r o j e c t s  and people) .  
S e r v i c e s  have been sp read  more t h i n l y  a c r o s s  a  wider  popu la t ion .  T h i s ,  of 
c o u r s e ,  is  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  i n  r ega rd  t o  p u b l i c  employment. The ambigui ty  of 
f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t y  and t h e  ambigui ty  of Lhe ends  of t l ~ e  law have l e d  t o  LhLs re- 
s u l t .  
The s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t e x t  is a s  desc r ibed  above. S t a t e  and l o c a l  governments 
have i n c r e a s i n g l y  become a  s t r o n g  i n L e r e s t  group wl th  Lhc Congress i n  regard 
t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of t h e i r  s t a k e s  a s  they p e r c e i v e  t l~em i n  t h e  in~p lemcn~aLion  
of t h e  program. Th i s  is a  broader  and more powerful Iobbylng f r o n t  Lhan i n  tl ie 
c a s e  o f  t h e  Unemployment In su rance  lobby.  There  i s  a  g r e a t  d e a l  of money a t  
s t a k e  and a  g r e a t  many b e n e f i t s  t o  be d i s t r i b u t e d .  I t  is, I~owcver ,  on ex tens ion  
of t h e  p r i n c i p a l  of bottoms-up found i n  t h e  Uneml)loyment In su rance  program. 
Prime Sponsors  a r e  found t o  vary g r e a t l y  i n  regard t o  t h e i r  compliance 
r e a d i n e s s  and compliance c a p a b i l i t y ,  simply because they a r e  new t o  t h e  bus ines s ,  
p lanning and e v a l u a t i o n  c a p a c i t i e s  a r e  weak, p ro fe s s ions1  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  
weak. and t h e  procesa  o f  c o n t r a c t i n g  f o r  s e r v i c e s  w i th  p rov ide r  g r o i ~ p s  and 
s e l e c t i o n  of t a r g e t  c l i e n t  groups has  been very much in f luenced  by l o c a l  d i s -  
t r i b u t i v e  p o l i t i c s .  T h i s  has  caused t h e  f e d e r a l  government t o  t h i n k  t h a t  i f  
c e r t a i n  g o a l s  a r e  t o  be  served which a r e  n a t i o n a l  i n  scope,  i t  must b e  done 
through a  r e c a t e g o r i z a t l o n  of t h e  law. For example, t h e  C a r t e r  Admin i s t r a t ion  
recommended a ~ l d  Congress accepted language i n  t h e  form of an ilmendn~ent t o  s t r e s s  
t h e  importance of s e r v i c e s  t o  t h e  disadvantaged.  However, t h e  empowerment of 
s o  many l o c a l  a g e n c i e s  o f  government has  compounded t h e  t a s k  of s e c u r i n g  
e f f e c t i v e  f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t y .  
A l l  t h e  above means t h a t  t h e  s t a t e s  vary  g r e a t l y ,  one from a n o t h e r .  The 
f e d e r a l  bureau can provide t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  a l t hough  i t  has  been slow t o  
develop c a p a b i l i t i e s  t o  do s o  i n  t h e  r e g i o n a l  o f f i c e s .  B u t  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of 
t h e  f e d e r a l  bureau t o  e n f o r c e  any s t a n d a r d s  has  been s e r i o u s l y  eroded by t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  law. The t a s k  now would seem t o  b e  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  f e d e r a l  
t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  r o l e  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a t  
t h e  g r a s s  r o o t s  f o r  p lanning and eva lua t ion .  However, t h e  q u e s t i o n  of s e c u r i n g  
t h e  e f f e c t i v e  s a n c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  achievement of n a t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  i s  ve ry  much 
i n  limbo. Th i s  i s  s u r e l y  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  because  of t h e  g r e a t e r  complexi ty  of 
t h e  s e r v i c e  d e l i v e r y  t a s k  compared t o  t h e  Unemployment In su rance  Funct ion.  
(Van Horn, 1978; Hargrove and Dean, 1978). 
USES (United S t a t e s  E~nployaent S e r v i c e s ) .  --- 
USES is a  f e d e r a l - s t a t e  program i n  which a l l  t h e  c o s t s  a r e  paid  by t h e  
f e d e r a l  government, p r i m a r i l y  through t h e  U I  Lrust  fund. The t a s k  o f  sLa te  
employment s e r v i c e  agenc ie s  is t o  b e t t e r  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  performance o f  j ob  
markets  by p l a c i n g  workers  i n  p o s i t i o n s  a s  i n d u s t r y  p r e s e n t s  them t o  t h e  
agenc ie s .  
There is g r e a t  ambigui ty  of t h e  ends and norms he re .  The Employment 
Se rv ice  has  always been a  f o s t e r  c h i l d  which has  never  had a  c l e a r  o b j e c t i v e  
of i ts own. The f e d e r a l  agency was c r e a t e d  i n  World War I t o  p l a c e  workers  
i n  product ion a g e n c i e s ,  bu t  i t  was pe rmi t t ed  t o  l a p s e  a f t e r  t h e  war because  i t  
was assumed t h a t  workers  could  f i n d  t h e i r  own p o s i t i o n s  i n  f r e e  markets  w i thou t  
he lp .  A numher of s t a t e  agenc ie s  cont inued t o  exist. .  however. The En~ployment 
Se rv ice  has  f a l l e n  between s t o o l s .  It was no t  needed a s  s l a b o r  market mechanism 
i n  a  g e n e r a l l y  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  c l i m a t e ,  nor  was i t  f u l l y  unders tood t o  be n 
w e l f a r e  program. So i t  could  no t  be l e g i t i m a t e  i n  Lhose terms.  The IJSES was 
c r e a t e d  by t h e  Wagner-Peyser Act i n  1933. Its primary job du r ing  t h e  Depress ion 
was t o  p l ace  workers  i n  p u b l i c  works employment. The passage of t h e  S o c i a l  
S e c u r i t y  Act provided f o r  f i n a n c i n g  t h e  E~oploy~nent S e r v i c e  system through Unem- 
ployment In su rance  t r u s t  fund payments. T h i s  meant t h a t  i t s  s e r v i c e s  were 
widely  const rued t o  be  t a r g e t e d  s o l e l y  on t h o s e  who were i n v o l u n t a r i l y  unemployed 
r a t h e r  t han  t h e  wider  u n i v e r s e  of t hose  who wish t o  change jobs .  
During World War 11, t h e  S e r v i c e  a g a i n  turned t o  a l l o c a t i n g  l a b o r  t o  
war i n d u s t r i e s .  A f t e r  t h e  war t h e  USES developed a  miss ion of un ive r sa l  s e r v i c e ,  
b u t  t h a t  never  took h o l d ,  and t h e  performance l e v e l s  were poor d u r i n g  t h e  1940s 
and 1950s. Labor un ions  developed t h e i r  own h i r i n g  h a l l s ,  ~ n a n i ~ f a c t u r e r s  were 
a b l e  t o  f i n d  s k i l l e d  l a b o r  f o r  themselves  through personnel  o f f l c e s .  t h e  c l v i l  
s e r v i c e  commissions of s t a t e  a n d - l o c a l  governments began t o  recruit f o r  them- 
s e l v e s ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  and middle-income s a l a r i e d  people  d i d  not  need  he s e r v i c e .  
Tl lerefore ,  i t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  found i t s e l f  f i l l i n g  p o s i t l o n s  i n  secondary l a b o r  
markets ,  1 . e .  low-paying Jobs  wi th  h igh  tu rnove r .  
The e f f o r t  i n  t h e  War on Pover ty  t o  t u r n  t h e  Employment S e r v i c e  i n t o  an 
agency t o  s e r v e  t h e  needs of t h e  disadvantaged p r i m a r i l y  is g e n e r a l l y  accorded 
t o  have been a  f a i l u r e .  The Employment S e r v i c e  agenc ie s  i n  t h e  s t a t e s  were 
s t i l l  concerned w i t h  meeting t h e  needs  o f  employers and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  found 
themsleves caught  i n  t h e  c o n f l i c t  between tlie d i s a d v a n ~ a g e d  and t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  
groups and t h e  needs  of t h e  employers.  Placements  f e l l  o f f  du r ing  t h e  1960s. 
Now, t h e  emphasis has  aga in  been s h i f t e d  toward placement and u n i v e r s a l  s e r -  
v i c e s ,  bu t  w i t h  t h e  same ambigui ty  about  whether t h e r e  is a c t u a l l y  a  widespread 
demand f o r  such s e r v i c e s .  
S u r v e i l l a n c e  and s a n c t i o n  of performance of s t a t e  agenc ie s  by t h e  f e d e r a l  
government have h i s t o r i c a l l y  been weak. S t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  have been a b l e  t o  play 
t h e i r  own s t a t e  governments o f f  a g a i n s t  t h e  f e d e r a l  government by c l a iming  t o  
each t h a t  they a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  o t h e r .  S ince  t h e  s t a t e s  do no t  provide 
any o f  t h e  money f o r  s t a l e  agency budgets ,  governors  and s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  
have l i t t l e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  cons ide r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and e f f i c i e n c y  of o p e r a t i o n s .  
Th i s  is r e i n f o r c e d  by tlie f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s e r v i c e s  a r e  d i f f u s e  and somewhat 
i n v i s i b l e  compared t o  t h e  t a n g i b l e  U I  check o r  t h e  t a n g i b l e  b e n e f i t  de r ived  from 
a  CETA job  o r  CETA t r a i n i n g  s l o t  which c a r r i e s  a  s t i p e n d .  However, s t a t e  
agenc ie s  have been a b l e  t o  r e s i s t  f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t y  by c l a iming  t o  be  s t a t e  
agencies .  The f e d e r a l  bureau has  been weak i n  p o l i t i c a l  r e sou rces  t o  a s s e r t  
i t s  a u t h o r i t y  ove r  s t a t e  agenc ie s ,  because  t h e r e  has  been no g r e a t  demand f o r  
t h i s  s e r v i c e ,  e i t h e r  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  o r  among s i g n i f i c a n t  e l i t e s  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  
of government. T h i s  r e f e r s  back t o  t h e  ambigui ty  o f  miss ion.  One f i n d s  some 
e f f o r t  a t  deve lop ing  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  models a t  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l  by means 
of which budge t s  can be a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  s t a t e s  acco rd ing  t o  performance, a s  
a l r eady  seen  i n  tl ie U I  program. However, t h e  g r e a t e r  complexity o f  t h e  program 
and t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of measur ing e f f e c t i v e  s e r v i c e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  regard t o  
h i g h l y  complex environments,  make tlie t a s k  more d i f f i c u l t .  
The compliance c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  t l ie s t a t e  a g e n c i e s  vary g r e a t l y .  Hargrove's 
(1976) s tudy  of t h e  s t a t e  a g e n c i e s  s e t s  o u t  t l ie f a c t o r s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  
e f f e c t i v e  a g e n c i e s  i n  some d e t a i l .  E f f e c t i v e n e s s  is de f ined  a s  t h e  number o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  p lacements  p e r  s t a f f  person yea r .  Both o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and economic 
environment c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  h igh  placement r a t e s .  S t a t e s  w i th  
h igh  r a t e s  of economic growth a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have h igh  r a t e s  of p lacement ,  b u t  
some s t a t e s  w i t h  low r a t e s  o f  growth a l s o  have liiglt r a t e s  of placement.  The 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e  sma l l  o f f i c e s ,  r e l a t i v e l y  wide spons  of c o n t r o l ,  
d e l e g a t i o n  downward, and a  h i g h l y  s u p p o r t i v e  p o l i t i c a l - b u s i n e s s  coaununity. 
High performing s t a t e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have ignored t h e  War on Poverty and focused 
on placements p e r  s e .  
A l l  t h i s  means t h a t  performance v a r i e s  g r e a t l y  among t h e  s t a t e s ,  b u t ,  
g iven t h e  a m b i g u i t i e s  a s  t o  mi s s ion  and low l e v e l s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  suppor t .  
o v e r a l l  performance is low: t h e s e  a g e n c i e s ' d o  no t  g r e a t l y  u f f e c t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  
of l a b o r  markets .  
From t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  o u r  franiework, t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  ef fect . iveness  of 
t h e s e  t h r e e  programs and t h e  v a r i a n c e  and l e v e l  of performance s tems no t  Erom 
s t r u c t u r a l  c o n t e x t ,  nor from s a n c t i o n s  and i n c e n t i v e s ,  nor from compliance 
r ead ines s  and c a p a b i l i t y ,  though some d i f f e r e n c e s  can be found h e r e ;  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  s t em l a r g e l y  from t h e  c l a r i t y  of t a s k s  and t h e  a l ) l l i t y  t o  s t rucLure  
an o r g a n i z a t i o n  around t h o s e  t a s k s .  U I  b a s i c a l l y  i s  an e l i g i b i l i t y - f ~ ~ n d i n g -  
d i s b u r s i n g  program. wh i l e  CETA and USES have l a r g e  s e r v i c e  d e l i v e r y  progrrtms 
wi th  ambiguous g o a l s  and imprec i se  o r  i r r e l e v a n t  ~ e c h n o l o g i e s  and i n  t h i s  re-  
s p e c t  USES is more cumbersome and complex than  CETA. 
We have placed unemployment i n su rance  on t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  continuum 
,because  t h e  f i g h t  h a s  been won p o l i t i c a l l y .  Y 
CETA manpower t r a i n i n g  is c l a s s i f i e d  a s  a  r e g u l a t o r y  program because  t h e r e  
is s t i l l  a  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e  over  whether t h e  p o l i c y  should be  d i s t r i b u t i v e  
o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e .  , . .. + 
We s e e  t h e  Employment S e r v i c e  a s  a  d i s t r i b u t i v e  program because  i t  pro- 
v i d e s  a  d i f f u s e ,  i n t a n g i b l e  s e r v i c e  about  which t h e r e  is l i t t l e  con t rove r sy  
o r  even exci tement .  There  is almost no Employment S e r v i c e  p o l i t i c s .  
. Of course .  chnnges i n  p o l i t i c a l  demand p a t t e r n s  f o r  any of t h e s e  programs 
could  a l t e r  t h e  p o l i c y  beneath  i t  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f  t h e  
progrnm. 
Thls  a n a l y t i c  framework is  p re sen ted  h e r e  a s  a  gu ide  t o  r e s e a r c h  by means 
of which c a s e  s t u d i e s  might be  placed i n  a  l a r g e r  c o n t e x t .  T h i s  would be  t h e  
b e s t  way t o  d e r i v e  theo ry  from cases .  The impress ion wi th  which programs have 
been l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  schema can be  improved by r e sea rch .  But,  a  schema is on ly  
t h a t  and no more. The c a s e s  e x i s t  on con t inua  and must a l s o  be  unders tood i n  
terms of t h e i r  uniqueness .  
Conclusion 
The Eramework could  be  an even tua l  gu ide  t o  p o l i c y  by sugges t ing  t h e  
changeable  and unchangeable p r o p e r t i e s  of programs. The p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  
I 
f 
Implementation of a  program I n  i ts l a r g e r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  might l e t  u s  know 
t h e  deg ree  t o  which i t  can be improved a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  w i t h i n  t h a t  con tex t  I 
and t h e  degree  t o  which p o l i t i c a l  change is requ i r ed  f o r  improvement. For 
I 
performance cu rve  o f  g iven programs. Replacing AFDC wi th  a  gurnnteed 
annua l  income would be suctl an  i n s t a n c e .  Such changes  could  then be  a s ses sed  
according t o  p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y .  
This  approach reminds u s  of t h e  i n t r a c t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  problems which many 
programs a t t a c k  and thus  pe rmi t s  u s  t o  a s k  fundamental q u e s t i o n s  about  t h e  
r o l e  o f  government. We have few r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  programs and t h e r e  is always 
p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  t o  push them i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  d i r e c t i o n .  Perhaps  
b e n e f i t s  must b e  perceived t o  be u n i v e r s a l  t o  be  p o l i t i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  i n  
a  s o c i e t y  o f  middle  c l a s s  va lues .  Regulatory  programs s o  o f t e n  appea r  t o  
f l ounde r  i n  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  because  of t h e  p l u r a l i s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  bases  which 
s t r u g g l e  f o r  c o n t r o l  of them. T h i s  i s ' d e m o c m t i c  p o l i t i c s  bu t  we a r e  pro- 
voked t o  a sk  how t h e  s o c i e t y  can r e s o l v e  Important  q u e s t i o n s  of e q u i t y  and 
j u s t i c e .  
We, t h e r e f o r e ,  p re sen t  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n a l  union of a  model and typology 
a s  a guide  t o  r e s e a r c h ,  an approach t o  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  and a  sou rce  of norma- 
t i v e  d i scuss ion  about  p o l i c y  i n  a  democracy. 
example, economists  o f t e n  recommend t h a t  r e g u l a t o r y  programs be improved by 
s u b s t i L u t i n g  t a x  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  d i r e c t  r e g u l a t i o n  and t h a t  s e r v i c e  d e l i v e r y  
programs be improved by s u b s t i t u t i n g  t r a n s f e r  payments f o r  t h e  d i r e c t  d e l i v e r y  
of s e r v i c e s .  T h l s  might make i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  on t h e  
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